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n January 2010, the Irish Supreme Court handed down its much-antici-
pated decision in DPP (Walsh) v Cash.1 This case centred on fingerprint
evidence which had been obtained from the appellant following his
arrest in relation to a burglary. The arrest was based on a match between finger-
prints taken at the scene of the crime and fingerprints held on a Garda Síóchána
(police) database. The retained fingerprints had been taken in relation to another
incident several years previously and it was unclear whether or not they had been
properly retained. Defence counsel argued that if the prosecution could not prove
the lawfulness of the retained fingerprints, then the arrest could not be seen as
lawful and the taking of fingerprints following the arrest was not lawful either. In
fact, it was argued, the fingerprint evidence ought to be excluded at trial as it had
been obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused.
Charleton J, giving the High Court judgment in Cash, was highly critical of the
strict exclusionary rule which has operated in Ireland for many years in the
context of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. While he ultimately held that
the rule was inapplicable on the facts, it was thought that the Supreme Court
might take the opportunity to address the exclusionary rule and either to support
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its ongoing strict application or row back on its inflexible terms and allow greater
discretion for trial judges.2
In the event, the Supreme Court did neither, preferring, it seems, to side-step any
in-depth discussion of the exclusionary rule. Nonetheless, or indeed because of the
view that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable, this case is of much significance
to the law on exclusion and to the judicial oversight of police investigations in
Ireland.
The Irish exclusionary rule
The Irish courts have, for some time, operated one of the strictest exclusionary
rules (if not the strictest one) in the common law world. Through an interesting
and intricate series of cases beginning in the mid-1960s with People (A-G) v O’Brien,3
on to People (DPP) v Kenny,4 and beyond,5 the legal basis for exclusion was estab-
lished, considered and reconsidered. The result of these cases and the discussions
therein was the construction and application of a two-tiered rule: a mandatory
exclusionary rule in relation to evidence obtained in breach of constitutional
rights, and a discretionary exclusionary rule in relation to evidence obtained in
breach of mere legal rights.
Armed with a strong written constitution and an expansive array of unenumer-
ated constitutional rights, the Irish courts made the above-outlined distinction
between breaches of differing rights, allowing for greater protection for constitu-
tional rights as compared with mere legal rights.
Where legal rights only have been interfered with in the gathering of evidence, the
trial judge holds a discretion to admit or exclude the impugned items of evidence,
taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Where constitutional rights
have been interfered with in the gathering of evidence, the trial judge has no
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discretion; the evidence is automatically excluded, unless there are extraordinary
excusing circumstances which justify its admission.6
Some confusion initially surrounded the circumstances in which exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence would occur, as the original formulation of
the rule in People (A-G) v O’Brien referred to a ‘deliberate and conscious’ breach of
rights. This seemed to require knowledge on the part of the garda (police officer)
who obtained the evidence that he was doing so in violation of constitutional
rights, and a related rationale of deterrence. However, through a series of cases
culminating in People (DPP) v Kenny, it was established that the basis for the Irish
operation of the rule was the protection of constitutional rights. The rationale of
deterrence (as applied in the courts of the United States7) was expressly rejected by
the Irish Supreme Court. The then Chief Justice, Finlay CJ, held that although a
strong protectionist stance could create problems in criminal trials given its
propensity to exclude from evidence items of immense probative value, the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty to protect the personal rights of the citizen
outweighs the social need to detect crime and convict guilty persons.8 He then set
out the exclusionary rule in the following terms:
… evidence obtained by invasion of the constitutional personal rights
of a citizen must be excluded unless a court is satisfied that … the act
constituting the breach of constitutional rights was committed
unintentionally or accidentally…9
Therefore, no question arises as to the knowledge of the violator of rights; all that
is required is that the action which resulted in the breach of rights was willed or
intended.
The strict, protectionist, exclusionary rule in relation to unconstitutionally
obtained evidence in Ireland has persisted ever since Kenny, and it has been used to
exclude both primary and derivative evidence (i.e. ‘fruit of the poisoned tree’). In
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relation to the latter, if a causative link can be shown between an item of evidence
and a breach of constitutional rights, then the evidence must be excluded.10
Despite the ongoing application of the strict exclusionary rule, it has been criti-
cised both on and off the judicial benches and calls for change have emerged in
recent times. The most significant of these calls for change came, in 2007, from the
ad hoc Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, which advocated a change to
the exclusionary rule allowing for the exercise of judicial discretion in relation to
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in all cases, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances, including the rights of the victim.11 Such change, it was
proposed, could come about by way of ordinary legislation (though this seems
unlikely due to the rule’s constitutional underpinnings), constitutional refer-
endum, or reinterpretation by the Supreme Court.12 The Cash case seemed
potentially to offer the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit and/or reinterpret
the rule.
DPP (Walsh) v Cash
As outlined above, defence counsel in Cash sought to have a set of fingerprints
taken from the appellant following his arrest on a burglary charge excluded from
evidence at trial. He had been arrested on the basis of a match between finger-
prints taken from the scene and prints that had been taken from him in relation to
another matter some years previously which were held on file in the Garda
Technical Bureau. The prosecution had been unable to state clearly the legal
position of the retained prints; whether they had been taken with consent or
under the statutory regime,13 and whether or not they ought to have been
destroyed following the passage of time and the fact that no proceedings had been
instituted in relation to the earlier matter.14
The main issue for consideration by the courts was whether the strict exclusionary
rule laid down in Kenny should be extended to cover facts not being offered as part
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of the evidence at a criminal trial but giving rise to the suspicion which led to the
arrest. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
is applicable only to evidence sought to be presented in a criminal trial, and has no
role in relation to evidence used to ground a reasonable suspicion for an arrest. In
the High Court Charleton J, dismissing the appeal, held that:
evidence resulting from a detention based upon a suspicion that
cannot be proved as being founded entirely upon evidence lawfully
obtained is not, for that reason, made unlawful.15
As he recognised no unlawfulness, the learned judge rejected the contention
that the exclusionary rule was applicable on the facts of this case. However, he
took the opportunity to express his negative view of that rule in quite forceful
terms:
[a] rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an
illegality occurring by a mistake does not commend itself to the
proper ordering of society which is the purpose of the criminal law.16
Charleton J considered that the decision whether or not to exclude evidence at
trial should be based on a balancing of the interests of society as against the
interests of the accused, taking into account the rights of the victim.
The Supreme Court followed the views of Charleton J in relation to the inapplica-
bility of the exclusionary rule on the facts of Cash and, accordingly, dismissed the
appeal. Despite not substantively addressing the content or operation of the
exclusionary rule, the decision of the seven-judge Supreme Court in Cash is of
much significance to the law in this area. While aiming, perhaps, to avoid the
thorny issue of exclusion, the court may have caused more harm than good.
Giving the decision of the court, Fennelly J held that the exclusionary rule is only
relevant to evidence proffered at a criminal trial and is not concerned with ‘the
lawful provenance of evidence used to ground a suspicion’.17 He suggested that the
appellant was seeking to extend the exclusionary rule beyond its correct bound-
aries and that doing so would ‘blur the distinction between the arrest and the
trial’.18
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The majority of the Supreme Court19 viewed the central issue then as the
lawfulness of the accused’s arrest, rather than any argument centred on the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to derivative evidence. Quoting from the High
Court decision, Fennelly J, in the Supreme Court, observed that, in relation to the
requirements of a lawful arrest, it has never been held that:
what would found a reasonable suspicion in law, requires to be based
on the kind of evidence that would be admissible under the rules of
evidence during the hearing of a criminal trial.20
He further stated that ‘[t]he lawfulness of an arrest and the admissibility of
evidence at trial are different matters which will normally be considered in
distinct contexts’.21
While this may be true in certain situations, there is an important distinction
between unconstitutionally obtained evidence and evidence which would not be
acceptable in the courts for other reasons; a distinction which the Supreme Court
failed to note. One example of material which might ground a lawful arrest but
would not be admissible as evidence at trial, which was mentioned by Charleton J
in the High Court, is hearsay evidence. The rationale for the exclusion of hearsay
evidence from a criminal trial relates to fears of unreliability and the dangers
inherent in not being able adequately to test such evidence in the courtroom.22
However, the rationale for the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
from trials in Ireland is based on the protection of constitutional rights, and this
was expressly noted by Fennelly J in the Supreme Court in Cash.23
One would have thought that, in order to give effect to the protectionist stance
adopted in Kenny, evidence obtained (or retained) in violation of constitutional
rights ought not to be allowed as the basis for a lawful arrest or, if relied upon to
ground an arrest, should render that arrest unconstitutional, and any evidence
subsequently obtained ought to be excluded accordingly. This would not only give
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effect to the protectionist rationale of the Kenny rule, but it would also be in line
with Irish jurisprudence on derivative evidence. If the retained set of fingerprints
in Cash ought to have been destroyed, then their retention would breach the
appellant’s right to privacy (both under the Constitution24 and under the
European Convention on Human Rights25) and their use to ground an arrest could
be seen as a breach of the right to liberty.26 The set of fingerprints thereafter
obtained when the appellant was in Garda detention following arrest ought then
to have been excluded from trial due to the earlier, causatively linked breach of
rights.
While the content of the exclusionary rule from Kenny may not have been
disturbed by the decision in Cash, the Supreme Court’s view that the rule is not
relevant to pre-arrest matters seems at variance with the general tenor of previous
Irish case law and provides a very weak basis for the protection of suspects’ rights.
A worrying question arises as to the power of the courts to exclude evidence
obtained post-arrest which is causatively linked to evidence purposefully obtained
in breach of constitutional rights pre-arrest. What power do the courts have
following Cash to defend and vindicate the rights of the accused in the pre-arrest
period of the criminal process? None it would seem, unless a distinction was
drawn between purposeful breach of rights and unknowing breach of rights. Such a
distinction, however, would alter the rationale of the exclusionary rule from
protectionism to deterrence as the central question would be one of Garda
intention rather than protection of rights.
Cases similar to Cash have been dealt with quite differently in other jurisdictions.
In England and Wales, for example, in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1999)27
(which involved a DNA sample rather than a fingerprint, but was largely similar
otherwise), the House of Lords considered a ‘triangulation of interests’ involving
the accused, the victim and the public, and held in favour of admitting the
relevant evidence. Although the ultimate decision then was the same as that in
Cash, at least the House of Lords left open the possibility that in an appropriate
case the balance might lie otherwise. The Irish Supreme Court, by contrast, seems
to have placed pre-arrest garda behaviour and breaches of constitutional rights
entirely beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule.28
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While the continuing application of a strict exclusionary rule in relation to uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland seems desirable, the Cash case suggests a
danger that it may give rise to obscure jurisprudence in efforts to avoid discussion
or reinterpretation. This is not desirable. Neither is the position created by Cash
whereby pre-arrest constitutional rights are left out in the cold.
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